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1.    Introduction 
On March second, 1947, a statement appeared at the very bottom of the second 
page of Neues Deutschland, the official newspaper of the Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany.  The statement would have been easy to overlook; the text was crammed into a 
small space by reducing the font size from that of normal newspaper print, and the 
headline was not as large or bold as others on the page.  That headline read: “Auflösung 
des Staates Preußen.”1  Below, in miniscule typeface, Law No. 46 of the Allied Control 
Council was reprinted, though it had gone into effect five days earlier, when it was signed 
in Berlin on February 25
th
.  Thus the citizenry of the Soviet Occupation Zone was 
informed of the dissolution of the once great state of Prussia, without ceremony, and 
certainly without mourning. 
 The publication of this notice reflects well the official stance on Prussia in the 
Soviet Occupation Zone and the early German Democratic Republic, characterized by 
erasure and silence.  Fast forward now to 1987: on January 24
th
 Neues Deutschland 
published an altogether different sort of article on Prussia.  In recognition of the 275
th
 
anniversary of Frederick II’s birthday, historian Ingrid Mittenzwei wrote a balanced and 
                                                        
1
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relatively positive assessment of the Prussian king, which took up nearly a full page.
2
 
This was no anomaly: since the seventies publications on Prussia had been growing in 
frequency and popularity.  Furthermore, the restoration of the Lindenforum in Berlin 
made the capital city’s Prussian history visible, even celebrated, once again.  The 
“rediscovery of Prussia” in the public sphere reached its culmination in 1986, the 200-
year anniversary of Frederick II’s death, with the popular exhibition “Friedrich II. und die 
Kunst” in Sans Souci park. 
What can account for such a complete reversal on the subject of East Germany’s 
Prussian history?  The German Democratic Republic was a Marxist-Leninist, socialist 
state with close political ties to the Soviet Union.  Prussia, on the other hand, carried (and 
to an extent still carries today) associations of militarism, conservatism, a reactionary 
aristocratic ruling class, and even proto-fascism.  How, then, was Prussia assimilated into 
the GDR’s Marxist-Leninist view of history?  Furthermore, how was the depiction of 
Prussia in the GDR used to support and shape a unique East German identity?  These are 
the questions that this thesis will explore, through the analysis of East German 
publications, films, and public events related to Prussian history and especially the 
mythos of Frederick II. 
 Literature on the subject of Prussia in the GDR is mostly limited to chapters and 
articles within books on broader topics, and is especially scarce in publications since the 
start of this century, though both Bärbel Holtz and Wolfgang Neugebauer of Humboldt 
University have written articles on Prussian historiography in the GDR within the last 
decade. Mary Fulbrook’s 1999 book German National Identity after the Holocaust makes 
                                                        
2
 Ingrid Mittenzwei, “Glockengeläut verkündete die Geburt des Prinzen,” Neues Deutschland, January 24, 
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several mentions of Prussia in regards to the GDR, though there is no chapter dedicated 
to the topic; hers is the only English literature on the subject I have found. Maoz 
Azaryahu’s book Von Wilhelmplatz zu Thälmannplatz. Politische Symbole im öffentlichen 
Leben der DDR, published in 1991, contains a few sections dedicated to the topic of 
specifically Prussian symbols. Of books published since Germany’s Reunification, the 
only ones dedicated solely to the topic of Prussia in the GDR are Hans Alexander 
Krauß’s 1993 Die Rolle Preußens in der DDR-Historiographie, and a 1997 publication of 
the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung called Der Wandel des Preußenbildes in den 
DDR-Medien, which is notable for its use of film rather than historical writing as a 
subject of analysis. 
 During the time of two Germanies, a few West German historians took an interest 
in their eastern counterparts’ view of Prussia, such as Peter Meyers, author of the 1983 
study Friedrich II. von Preußen im Geschichtsbild der SBZ/DDR, which focuses on 
historical writing and history lessons in East German schools. As early as 1964, in the 
West German work Besinnung auf Preußen, Fritz Kopp contributed a chapter on Preußen 
und die SED.  In the late years of the GDR, there was growing self-awareness on the part 
of East German historians.  This resulted in publications such as Erbe und Tradition in 
der DDR. Die Diskussion der Historiker, edited by Helmut Meier and Walter Schmidt, in 
1989, in which a number of historians treat the subject of Prussia in detail or in passing. 
 These publications provide plenty of material on the GDR’s scholarly 
publications on Prussia, but to my knowledge no work has yet attempted to synthesize the 
analysis of historiography, media, and public symbols and events in one work.  The 
narrow historiographical focus of most existing scholarship provides only a limited view 
 Munn 4 
into the GDR’s concept of Prussia.  Most historical publications would not be read by the 
average East German citizen; newspapers and films, however, were regularly consumed, 
which is why the bulk of my work rests on the analysis of these sources.  These products, 
made for mass-consumption, are meant to both entertain and instruct: the latter is 
especially true in the case of state-controlled media.  By examining the depiction of 
Prussia in newspaper articles, film, and public works, one can come nearer to seeing what 
the citizen of the GDR saw.  Though their thoughts, for the most part, can only be the 
subject of surmise, what can be inferred with greater certainty is what the regime wanted 
citizens to think by presenting them with a carefully considered image of history. 
 
2.    Chronology and Context 
The development of the view of Prussia in GDR historiography can be divided 
into three main phases.
3
  For the purposes of this thesis, they are divided thus: 1945-1951, 
1951-1973, and 1973-1989.  These dates should not be considered set in stone; the 
characteristics of one phase will inevitably bleed across the division into another to a 
certain extent.  While 1945 and 1989 are self-evident choices, 1951 and 1973 happen to 
be where the most clear divisions fall in the body of evidence I have collected.  Were 
other evidence to be taken into consideration, these dates could certainly shift a year or 
two.  The chronology is by no means arbitrary, however; the divisions roughly 
correspond to other developments in the history of the GDR which, while they should not 
                                                        
3
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be assumed to be the exclusive cause of historiographical shifts, nevertheless provide 
context for the changing depiction of Prussia. 
In the 1950s, before the official recognition of the GDR as its own state, the SED 
was still interested in achieving national unity in one common, socialist Germany—their 
Western neighbors simply had not yet overcome the penultimate, capitalist phase of 
history.
4
  At the same time, the groundwork was being laid for the East German 
Nationale Volksarmee in response to the rearmament of West Germany.  These 
circumstances may account to an extent for the rehabilitation of Prussian generals of the 
1813-14 Befreiungskriege, most notably August von Gneisenau and Gerhard von 
Scharnhorst, which was already evident in 1952.
5
  These “German patriots” could be 
heroes and examples not only for the whole German nation, divided though it was,
6
 but 
also for a new East German army, given the reforms the Prussian generals brought about 
and their support of the Russian-Prussian Waffenbruderschaft against Napoleon.  
According to communist politician Fred Oelßner, a socialist army, like that of the Soviet 
Union, had nothing to do with militarism;
7
 the Prussian generals, considered models for 
the new socialist soldier, were likewise rid of their earlier association with “Prussian 
militarism.” 
With the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 came a new sense of stability for 
the East German regime.  This can be taken as a halfway point of the middle phase, after 
which the interpretation of Prussian history continued to grow more flexible.  Later in 
that decade, the commencement of Ostpolitik served as a catalyst for this process.  The 
                                                        
4
 Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 134. 
5
 Maoz Azaryahu, Von Wilhelmplatz zu Thälmannplatz. Politische Symbole im öffentlichen Leben der DDR 
(Gerlingen: Bleicher, 1991), 136-137. 
6
 Azaryahu, Politische Symbole, 137. 
7
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international recognition granted to the GDR in the treaties of the early 1970s solidified 
the existence of two separate German states.  On the part of the SED, this also led to an 
attempt to solidify the distinct identities of two separate German nations.
8
  The new 
concept of the nation was predicated on class, rather than ethnicity,
9
 thereby widening the 
divide between the FRG and the GDR.
10
  The GDR’s search for a unique national 
consciousness corresponded, somewhat ironically, with the appropriation of an ever 
broader swath of German history in the last phase of the GDR.
11
  In the late 70s, 
previously marginalized figures such as Martin Luther become the subject of new 
discussions and even celebrations.
12
  In the 1980s this extended most notably to Frederick 
the Great, and had the GDR not ceased to exist, there were indications that even the 
conservative founder of the German Reich, Otto von Bismarck, may have enjoyed a 
similar renaissance of public commemoration.
13
  Laying claim to more of German history 
was not incompatible with forging a specifically East German identity, however.  
Presenting the GDR as the inheritor of the whole of German history strengthened the 
SED’s claim to cultural, and by extension political, legitimacy.14  Furthermore, the 
appropriation of history was not carried out with a blind eye to the moral values of 
socialism; while certain cultural artifacts were depoliticized in order to be reincorporated 
into the public sphere, historians and politicians were acutely aware of the distinctions 
between positive and negative elements of history, which were to be drawn with a 
                                                        
8
 Fulbrook, National Identity, 20.  This shift also roughly corresponds to Erich Honecker’s replacement of 




 As Fulbrook notes, the official East German view of the GDR as a separate nation was not necessarily 
shared by the East German citizenry.  Fulbrook, National Identity, 21. 
11
 Ibid., 89. 
12
 Azaryahu, Politische Symbole, 143. 
13
 Ibid., 146. 
14
 Cf. Fulbrook, National Identity, 89-90. 
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nuanced hand.  In the historical field, this manifested itself in the debate over Erbe 
(heritage or legacy), which stemmed from the whole of German history, and Tradition, 
which stemmed from socialism.
15
 
The acknowledgment of Prussia’s place in the Erbe of the GDR and the 
celebration of its heroes can be ascribed to a number of developments.  One is the 
growing economic instability of the GDR in the 1980s, which could have made greater 
cultural stability appear all the more desirable.
16
  Historian Maoz Azaryahu surmises the 
opposite in attributing the recognition of Prussia to the relative stability of the GDR under 
the leadership of Erich Honecker,
17
 by which one must assume Azaryahu means the 
earlier part of Honecker’s regime and the adoption of “consumer socialism,” though this 
occurred well before the most marked developments in the treatment of Prussia. 
Another factor to consider is the changing historiography in the West, with which 
the East saw itself to be in competition.  The FRG also went through different phases in 
its perception of Prussia, the most notable event in its development being the well-
attended exhibit Preußen—Versuch einer Bilanz in Berlin in 1981.18  The 1980s saw a 
surge in the “heritage industry” far beyond the two Germanies, however; thus the GDR 
was participating in an international trend as well.
19
 
                                                        
15
 See Helmut Meier and Walter Schmidt, eds., Erbe und Tradition in der DDR. Die Diskussion der 
Historiker (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1989). 
16
 Fulbrook, National Identity, 89, 133. 
17
 Azaryahu, Politische Symbole, 144-145. 
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 Azaryahu, Politische Symbole, 145; Fulbrook, National Identity, 90. 
19
 Fulbrook, National Identity, 90.  Fulbrook cautions against viewing the correlation of events as 
causation: “Although one can see functionality for a GDR ‘national legitimation’  of developments such as 
the Tradition/Erbe debate, one must nevertheless ask whether the function explains these developments” 
(ibid., 134). 
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Keeping this historical context in mind, this thesis will focus on how the image of 
Prussia was constructed for viewing by the East German citizen, rather than engaging in a 




3. The Geschichtsbild in the GDR 
3.1    What is a Geschichtsbild? 
 First it is necessary to understand the concept of the Geschichtsbild.  A common 
English translation would be “image of history,” though literally it is more akin to 
“history-picture.”  In reality it is an all-encompassing term for a complete 
conceptualization of history, which holds a certain theoretical and historiographical 
viewpoint.  Wolfgang Schlegel gives multiple definitions for the word; one is historical-
political and material, and relates to the content of history and the evaluation of historical 
events, persons, and eras.
21
  This definition is relevant to historical works and exhibitions 
and how they present their subject matter.  Another definition is philosophical-technical, 
and defines a Geschichtsbild as a philosophical concept, concerned with the driving 
forces, form, and goal of the historical process.
22
  We will first concern ourselves with 
this definition in order to explore the sanctioned socialist theory of the historical process 
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22
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3.2    The Function of the Geschichtsbild in the GDR 
 The Geschichtsbild of the GDR was above all determined by a Marxist-Leninist 
interpretation of history.  The primary element of the Marxist-Leninist view is historical 
materialism.  The historical materialistic theory was first articulated by Marx and Engels, 
and takes the position that history is pushed forward first and foremost by economic, not 
philosophical, forces.  This progress takes the dialectic form of contradicting interests and 
forces: a thesis is opposed by an antithesis, resulting in a synthesis of the two, which is 
met by a new antithesis; and so the process repeats.
23
 
 In his work on Frederick II in the Geschichtsbild of the GDR, Peter Meyers lists 
the promotion of the historical materialistic view and dialectical thinking as two 
important functions of the Geschichtsbild in the GDR.
24
  A dialectically grounded 
interpretation of history is linear and progressive, and therefore also relates to the future; 
the dialectic will continue and culminate in the fulfillment of Socialism’s historical 
mission with its final victory over Capitalism.  The Geschichtsbild therefore must make 
that historical mission clear, thereby prescribing certain attitudes and behaviors for the 
citizen which will support the achievement of that goal.  This is closely tied to another 
function of the Geschichtsbild: to provide citizens with a sense of purpose in their lives.  
That purpose, of course, was to contribute to social progress.
25
 
 It was equally important that the Geschichtsbild clarify the role of both the 
working masses and of significant figures in the historical process.  Though these might 
seem contradictory to each other, especially considering the emphasis placed on the 
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 Karl Mielcke, Historischer Materialismus: Die Lehren von Karl Marx (Stuttgart: Klet, 1960), 5. 
24
 Meyers, Friedrich II., 17. 
25
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people at large in socialist ideology, famous individuals could also provide specific 
examples of behavior, both negative and positive, from which the people could learn.
26
 
 Lastly, the Geschichtsbild needed to prepare the citizenry to confront enemy 
ideology.
27
  The socialist citizen must be ready for the fight against class enemies—
primarily the capitalist USA and FRG.  For this the citizen needed to be armed with an 
understanding of both the reactionary and revolutionary tradition in German history.  The 
GDR was seen as the inheritor of the revolutionary tradition, while the FRG was 
considered the inheritor of the reactionary tradition.  Citizens of the GDR had to 
understand the role this double-line had played in German history, so that they would be 
prepared for the socialist struggle in the future. 
 The ultimate goal of the Geschichtsbild in the GDR was therefore the education 
and motivation of the citizen.  According to Meyers, “das Geschichtsbild soll dem Bürger 
die Begründung dafür liefern, daß sich die historische Mission der Arbeiterklasse in der 
DDR verwirklicht und erfüllt hat.”28  The role of the historical discipline, therefore, was 
to develop this Geschichtsbild and support the goals of citizen education within this 
school of thought.  This was a decidedly political role, though historical research became 
increasingly independent in the later GDR.
29
  According to socialist ideology however, it 
was the historian’s duty to serve the stability of society.30  They should not simply have a 
disinterestedly scientific goal, but rather they should provide legitimacy to the socialist 
                                                        
26





 Ibid., 20. 
29
 Wolfgang Neugebauer, “Preußen als Forschungsthema in der DDR und in Polen,” in Das 17. Und 18. 
Jahrhundert und Große Themen der Geschichte Preußens (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2009), 105. 
30
 Meyers, Friedrich II., 22. 
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society,
31
 which in the FRG was viewed as a violation of the desired impartiality of 
academia,
32
 although it might be argued that this West German “impartiality” is also a 
historical construct. 
 
4. Prussia’s Changing Role in the Geschichtsbild of the GDR 
For each phase of GDR history, I will first examine publications by historians to 
outline the dominant historiographical view, supplemented where appropriate by 
newspaper articles, followed by public events, such as demolitions, restorations, and 
exhibitions, and lastly, films. 
 
4.1    1945-1951: The Post-War Period 
    4.1.1    Historiography and Publications 
 In the Soviet Occupation Zone and early GDR, the prevailing theory of German 
history was the “Misere,” or misery, concept.  This concept held that the Prussian-
dominated history of Germany since the period of reform in the early 19
th
 century up 
until the “Trümmerfelder” of 1945 had become “eine einzige Misere.”33  The reason was 
reactionary Prussianism.
34
  According to Bärbel Holtz, “Deutsche Misere und Preußen 
wurden insgesamt gleichgesetzt.”35  In his 1946 publication “Irrweg einer Nation,” the 
German communist politician and journalist Alexander Abusch wrote of the two lines of 
German history: the reactionary and the progressive, the latter of which could have 
                                                        
31
 Holtz, “Thema Preußen,” 330. 
32
 Meyers, Friedrich II., 25. 
33
 Holtz, “Thema Preußen,” 333. 
34
 A work by two Moscow historians, Efim Pavloviè and Ilja Preis, titled “Marx und Engels über das 
reaktionäre Preußentum,” which had been published in 1942, was translated into German in 1946 (ibid.).  
These historians would be writing in a Stalinist vein during the Second World War. 
35
 Ibid. 
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offered an alternative course for the country.
36
  In Abusch’s view, the reactionary line 
that had won out up until that point was comprised of Prussia and its accompanying 
militarism.  This two-pronged theory, as described, was prevalent throughout the history 
of the GDR,
37
 and Prussia’s journey in the Geschichtsbild was largely a matter of 
shifting, at least in part, from the negative line to the positive one.  In this early phase 
however, Prussia was consigned wholly to the negative line. 
 This unqualified condemnation of Prussia as Germany’s plight is evident in 
newspaper publications surrounding the dissolution of Prussia in early 1947.  Two 
articles in Neues Deutschland, “Preußen gestern und heute” and “Preußen in der 
deutschen Geschichte,” appearing on January 21st and March 1st respectively, 
characterized Prussia as a military colony of Brandenburg:
38
 a territory conquered and 
ruled by knights who carried out a ruthless campaign of expansion at the expense of the 
German people.
39
  Prussia was portrayed as the ultimate enemy of Germany, acting ever 
contrary to the interests of the people in order to preserve power in the hands of the few 
and, in good Marxist-Leninist fashion, conspiring with capitalist imperialists and 
industrialists to oppress the masses and pursue aggressive military policy.
40
 According to 
“Preußen in der deutschen Geschichte,” Frederick II’s Seven Years War was “eine 
Glanzleistung dieser preußischen Politik gegen Deutschland,” after which Prussia 
continued to seek great-power status at the expense of the German proletariat.
41
  There 
grew the “menschenfeindliche Bund zwischen dem preußisch-deutschen Militarismus 






 Alfred Lemmnitz, “Preußen gestern und heute,” Neues Deutschland, January 21, 1947. 
39
 Ibid.; Karl Obermann, “Preußen in der deutschen Geschichte,” Neues Deutschland, March 1, 1947. 
40
 Lemnitz, “Gestern und heute”; Obermann, “Deutsche Geschichte.” 
41
 Obermann, “Deutsche Geschichte.” 
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und dem kapitalistischen Imperialismus, der sich die ganze Welt zum Schlachtfeld 
erkor,”42 and which would end with the misery of the Trümmerfelder.  The line of 
continuity from Prussia to the Third Reich is clearly drawn: “Die preußische 
Expansionspolitik wurde zum wesentlichen Inhalt der Bestrebungen des vom Monopol- 
und Finanzkapital getragenen Faschismus,”43 states Lemnitz; “das Hitlerreich und der 
zweite Weltkrieg sind die Ergebnisse der Verpreußung [Prussianization] Deutschlands”44 
is Obermann’s unequivocal conclusion. 
 The solution was clear to the Neues Deutschland writers: Prussia must be 
dissolved.  The March 1
st
 article, which was published shortly after this was achieved, 
makes the point that this solution had been put forward by the founders of Communism 
in the previous century: “Die Rolle Preußens in der deutschen Geschichte klarlegen, hieß 
für Marx und Engels den Weg zu weisen zur Überwindung der Misere der deutschen 
Geschichte, d. h. zur Auflösung Preußens in Deutschland.”45  By severing itself from the 
negative line of German history, the GDR would be free to forge a new path for the 
nation, grounded in the revolutionary, rather than reactionary Prussian, line: “die 
Auflösung Preußens verschafft Deutschland die Möglichkeit einer neuen Zukunft.”46  
This was not a fait accompli with Control Council Order No. 46, however.  As “Preußen 
gestern und heute” points out, “Es ist […] nicht die territoriale und die staatsrechtliche 
Auflösung, die vor einer Wiederkehr der preußischen Reaktion sichern, sondern die 
soziale Umwandlung.”47  The new socialist policies and structure of the GDR would 
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guide its citizens in this societal transformation.  There remained the threat of the West, 
however, where society had not been rid of the Prussian “Misere,” despite the de jure 
dissolution of the state.  Thus the two prongs of German history continued, one line 
embodied in each half of the country.  Both articles make clear that though the old 
Prussian lands of the GDR had been rid of Prussianism, the FRG had fully inherited the 
Prussian reactionary tradition.
48
  Therefore, “Vielmehr sind die altpreußischen Länder” 
(the GDR) “[…] Musterbeispiele der demokratischen Erneuerung des deutschen Volkes 
zu werden.”49  The historical mission of the GDR was to uproot all traces of reactionary 
Prussianism, not only within its borders but beyond, so that one day all of Germany 
would be progressive and democratic.
50
  Prussia’s position in the Geschichtsbild of the 
GDR at the time is neatly portrayed in the concluding statement of “Preußen in der 
deutschen Geschichte”: “Dem Beschluß der Auflösung Preußens muß […] die wirkliche 
Zerstörung der Grundlagen des Preußentums in ganz Deutschland folgen.”51 
 
     4.1.2    Public Symbols and Events: The fate of the Berliner Stadtschloss 
 It was not enough to erase Prussia from the map, however.  The most prominent 
reminders of Hohenzollern Prussia had to be erased from view as well.  Thus is it was 
that, a full five years after the war’s end, the Berliner Stadtschloss, former residence of 
Prussian kings and German Kaisers in the heart of the capital city, was consigned to 
demolition.  The palace had been extensively damaged by Allied bombs during the war,
52
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 Obermann, “Deutsche Geschichte.” 
52
 Alexander Holland, Marc Schnurbus, and K. Marie Walter, Das Berliner Schloss: Die Geschichte des 
Berliner Schlosses (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 2004), 42. 
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but the skeleton of the main dome still stood above the surrounding ruins; “In dem 
Trümmermeer von 1945 war es wie ein Symbol, daß wenigstens die größte und 
bedeutendste Architektur der Stadt einigermaßen über den Krieg gekommen war.”53  In 
the immediate post-war period a future life for the palace seemed more than possible, as 
the White Room, which had survived the war intact, served as an exhibition space as 
early as 1945.
54
  Until 1948, architectural, artistic, and historical exhibitions were housed 
in the White Room, though discussions of partial or full demolition were already 
underway in political circles.  The most common argument for demolition was that 
Berlin, like Moscow, should have a military parade square in the center of the city;
55
 the 
Stadtschloss was in the perfect location, and there were no fitting preexisting open 
spaces.  More politically symbolic reasons lay behind the demolition arguments, 
however; Heinrich Starck, the KPD mayor of Friedrichshain and Assistant Councilor for 
Building and Housing, called the palace “ein Symbol einer für uns nicht mehr tragbaren 
Zeit.”56  Proponents of preservation and reconstruction hoped that the palace exhibitions 
would help their cause by demonstrating the modern potential of the building and 
separating it from its undesirable historical associations,
57
 and for a while it seemed that 
total demolition could be avoided.
58
 Even Starck changed his view after learning the true 
artistic and cultural worth of the building.
59
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 of October scenes for the Russian film “Die Schlacht um Berlin” were filmed in 
and around the palace, resulting in yet further damage; the staged shelling shattered more 
than 200 windows and destroyed a cherubic statue group, and Soviet soldiers vandalized 
the interiors as well.
60
  As the permission for this film shoot shows, political forces were 
pushing hard for demolition.  Those supposedly responsible for the care of monuments 
did more harm than good; “sie faßten ihr Amt lediglich als politische Aufgabe auf, um 
die Standbilder zu beseitigen, die Herrscher, Staatsmänner oder Generäle darstellen, oder 
die das Andenken an die Toten ehrten, die ihr Leben für Preußen oder Deutschland 
geopfert hatten.”61  In the socially renewed and democratized GDR, honoring the 
memory of Prussia was entirely unallowable. 
 No official of the SED held this stance more firmly than the leader of the Party 
himself, Walter Ulbricht.  While there were many ostensible reasons to support the 
demolition of the Stadtschloss, such as lack of funds and materials, Ulbricht’s personal 
attitude towards the Hohenzollern residence did not go unnoticed; Wilhelm Zaisser and 
Rudolf Herrnstadt, members of the SED Politburo, claimed that Ulbricht had always 
hated the palace as a symbol of the old Germany;
62
 that is, of Prussia.  Art historian 
Gerhard Strauß clearly outlines this ideological view of the palace in his published theses 
entitled “Was ist das Berliner Schloss?”: 
 Bei seiner Entstehung: 
Ergebnis des Repräsentationsbedürfnisses des sich zentralisierenden 
preußischen Absolutismus, dessen Hausmacht seit dem Dreißigjährigen Kriege 
vergrößert wurde im Bündnis mit oder gegen dem deutschen Kaiser, mehr mit als 
gegen ausländische Staaten und nie im Interesse des deutschen Volkes und seiner 
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nationalen Existenz, sondern immer in demjenigen der eigenen Hausmacht, die 
zudem ihre Untertanen bis zur Leibeigensklaverei ausbeutete und schon während 
des Schloßbaues Akkordarbeit verlangte. 
 
 1950: 
Symbol des völligen Verfalls jener feudalistischen und imperialistischen 
Macht, die es einst hatte entstehen lassen. In deren Untergang es dann ähnliche 
Wunden erhielt wie das ganze deutsche Volk. 
 
 Schlußfolgerung: 
Das deutsche Volk, das erstmalig in seiner Geschichte durch seine Majorität 
für seine Majorität handelt, hat das Recht, seiner Hauptstadt Berlin ein Antlitz zu 




Strauß applies the same logic to the Berliner Stadtschloss as journalists had used in their 
evaluation of all of Prussian history.  The palace was a symbol for all of Prussia’s 
absolutist, imperialist, feudal abuses of power, its anti-German, anti-proletarian policies; 
it was a stain that had to be removed in order for the democratization of German society 
to be complete.  The outward appearance of the new, socialist Germany had to match the 
inner shift of society to the progressive line of history. 
Ulbricht’s influence on city planning, especially in Berlin, rose sharply in late 
1949,
64
 and the prospects for the survival of the Stadtschloss declined.  In the end, the 
most radical option for the future of the palace won out: on August 23
rd
, 1950, it was 
decided that the palace would be completely destroyed.  Nothing was to be saved.  As a 
Neues Deutschland article from August 26
th, 1950 claimed, the Stadtschloss “soll uns 
nicht mehr an unrühmlich Vergangenes erinnern.”65 
Officially, the demolition of the palace was not an act of erasure.  Rather, it was a 
key step in the reconstruction of Berlin.  The abovementioned article form August 26
th
 is 
titled “Deutschlands Haupstadt ersteht neu: Der Lustgarten soll bis zum 1. Mai 1951 ein 
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neues Gesicht erhalten”; the focus is on the new and improved appearance of the city 
center, not on the destruction of the historic palace.  Ulbricht firmly established this 
stance in his speech for the Third Parteitag of the SED on the 22
nd
 of July, only a month 
before the final decision on demolition.  He spoke strongly of the need for reconstruction 
efforts to adhere strictly to administrative plans, and referred to the rebuilding of Berlin 
(referred to as the “Hauptstadt Deutschlands”) as the most important task of the new 
republic.  The area of the Berliner Statdtschloss was to play an essential role in this 
project: “Das Zentrum unserer Hauptstadt, der Lustgarten und das Gebiet der jetzigen 
Schloßruine, müssen zu dem großen Demonstrationsplatz werden, auf dem der 
Kampfwille und Aufbauwille unseres Volkes Ausdruck finden können.”66  The new face 
of the Lustgarten was framed as a positive and necessary change appropriate to the new 
character of Germany. 
While articles extolling this “Wiederaufbau” were common, any actual discussion 
of the fate of the Stadtschloss was noticeably lacking in the eastern part of Germany.  
Though there was extensive and vocal opposition to the demolition, the debate was not 
publicized except in the West.  On September 7
th
, the very day after the demolition 
process had begun, an article titled “Planmäßiger Aufbau unserer Städte” appeared in 
Neues Deutschland; it referred to the destruction wrought by barbaric Anglo-American 
air raids, but not to the destruction occurring at that very moment, five years later, in the 
heart of Berlin.  Yet again, reconstruction was framed as an opportunity for cultural 
expression in the new Germany.
67
  Unlike in 1947, at the time of the dissolution of 
Prussia, erasure was now accompanied by silence—or rather by purposefully distracting 
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noise.  The population of East Berlin lacked both information and an effective 
mouthpiece: architectural critic Nikolaus Bernau asserts, “Hinzu kam vielleicht noch die 
für Berlin spezifische ‘Traditionslosigkeit,’ welche die Zerstörung des Schlosses 
förderte.”68  Preserving tradition would mean preserving a piece of the past, but the past 
was shaped by the Prussian state.  The Stadtschloss was an “imperialistisches Zeichen 
preußischen Militarismus,” and accordingly, the memory of the palace itself became 
taboo.
69
  On May 1
st
, 1951, the Lustgarten was renamed “Marx-Engels-Platz,”70 and the 
erasure of this symbol of the Prussian past was complete.  
 
    4.1.3    Film: Die blauen Schwerter 
Released in late 1949, Die blauen Schwerter was one of the first period films by 
DEFA, the Deutsche Film Aktiengesellschaft, to appear in East German theaters.  The 
officially approved Geschichtsbild of the GDR is clearly reinforced in the film, 
unsurprisingly, as it was made by a state-run studio.  The dominant view of Prussia as an 
oppressive state of militarism and enforced subservience, ruled by a wasteful and self-
aggrandizing monarch, is recreated on the screen in Die blauen Schwerter, even though 
the film depicts early 18
th
 century Prussian history, before its rise to the status of 
European power with one of the most effective and feared militaries in existence. 
The titular blue swords refer to the trademark of Meissen porcelain, the first 
porcelain to be produced in Europe.  The film tells the story of Johann Friedrich Böttger, 
who is largely accredited with discovering the secret of porcelain manufacture in 1708 
while in the service of Augustus II the Strong, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland. 
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The story starts, however, in Berlin in 1701, in the Prussia of King Frederick I.  
The monarch is introduced when he receives a scheming monk, Laskari, who claims to 
know the secrets of producing gold.  If Laskari’s apprentice, Böttger, can successfully 
demonstrate this act of alchemy, the king will pay Laskari generously and keep Böttger in 
his service. 
The scene opens with Frederick I sitting on his ornate throne in a spacious and 
richly decorated, though mostly empty, throne room.  An architect and an advisor are 
presenting plans for a new building—perhaps a palace.  The king has a complaint about 
the plans: “Sechs Pilaster auf jeder Seit, aber warum nicht zwölf?”  When the advisor 
raises an objection due to the already inordinate costs of construction, Frederick ignores 
him, adamantly repeating the question “Why not twelve?”  He then exclaims, “Höher!  
Höher!  Wir haben den Wunsch da schon zwei mal geäußert!”  The advisor again 
attempts to caution his monarch, but the king turns his head away in irritated distraction.  
His last hurried words to the architect as Laskari is being shown in are: “Wir wollen das 
größer haben.”  The Prussian king’s obsession with the grandiose thus established, the 
stage is set for Laskari’s tempting offer.  Laskari, serene and hypnotic, entrances him 
easily; the king’s eyes shine greedily as he impatiently demands guarantees. 
After Laskari leaves, Frederick schemes with another advisor—this one 
apparently more important and closer to the king.  As they stroll across the throne room, a 
scene is revealed of two artists working on a life-sized model of the king.  Frederick 
bemoans the fact that it costs 4000 thalers “unsere Person für die Ewigkeit zu behalten. 
[…] Diese Sachen kosten heute unheimlich.” 
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 The portrayal of a monarch as self-centered, vain, and prone to superfluous 
spending in a production by a socialist state-sponsored film company is far from 
surprising.  Augustus II is portrayed with all of these qualities as well; yet, the depictions 
of the Prussian and Polish monarchs do differ, and the contrast is telling.  The scenes at 
Augustus’ Dresden palace are filled with a reckless decadence that is lacking in the 
Prussian court, for all its profligacy.  Though his throne room itself is an opulent setting, 
Frederick I’s extravagance remains for the most part off screen.  We never actually see 
him spending his money or indulging.  Augustus II, on the other hand, plays cards, drinks 
in excess, and enjoys the company of women.  The mise-en-scène around Augustus tends 
to be visually over-abundant; in contrast to the bright and airy Prussian court, the shots 
look dark and cluttered with glittering ornaments and rich textures, from the murals 
spanning entire walls to the Polish king’s luxurious fur coat that dwarfs his unimpressive 
frame. 
 The monarchs represent different forms of excess and abuse of wealth and power.  
Prussia is wasteful and self-aggrandizing, but not debauched.  Rather, order and at least 
the outward appearance of restraint prevail.  This is emphasized by the military character 
of the state.  Though it is not yet the Prussia of the Soldier King or Frederick the Great, 
the filmmakers have taken care to portray the expected military associations.  It is 
mentioned early on that Prussia is involved in the War of Spanish Succession, which 
remains distant and yet present in the background for the Prussian section of the film.   
Then there are the Prussian soldiers themselves, who pursue a hapless Böttger to 
Wittenberg.  Tricked by Laskari, Böttger is unable to produce more gold for the Prussian 
king and is forced to flee.  Believing that he is taking the gold for himself, Frederick 
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sends after him.  A couple of Saxon peasants, surprised at the presence of Prussian 
soldiers in Wittenberg, comment suspiciously that perhaps they are there because of the 
war in a brief exchange that emphasizes the gap between the honest, simple workers and 
the military servants of the king’s personal will.  The Prussian soldiers are portrayed as 
blindly obedient; the officer in charge of the search is little more than a quickly angered 
automaton.  When meeting with a Saxon official to request his cooperation, it becomes 
clear the officer neither knows nor particularly cares why he has been ordered to capture 
Böttger; he offhandedly tells the Saxon official that Böttger is wanted for “Giftmischerei 
oder so etwas.”  Once Böttger is caught, the officer loses his temper and yells 
intimidatingly in Böttger’s face when he denies any wrongdoing, despite the fact that the 
officer has admitted he does not know exactly what his prisoner is accused of.  Thus a 
Prussian officer from the year 1701, long before Prussia gained its association with the 
“Untertanengeist,” is portrayed with all the stereotypes of a later age; he represents the 
perceived unquestioning obedience and violence characteristic of Prussia that was 
conceptualized as paving the way for the Third Reich.  Together king and soldier 
reinforce the view of Prussia as an oppressive, feudal state, the enemy of the common 
man, governed with military rigidity. 
 
4.2    1951-1973: Building a Socialist Society 
     4.2.1    Historiography and Publications 
 The fifties and sixties were characterized by the building of a socialist society.  
This involved the development of a national identity within the framework of socialism.  
After the rejection of history and heritage and the dominance of the “Misere” concept in 
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the earlier phase, a new, more patriotic view of German history was required.  Though 
this reversal could be seen as contradictory, it was necessary; patriotism was essential to 
a nationally unified form of thinking that would value the progressive aspects of the 
national history.  As early as 1952, Walter Ulbricht stated, “Das patriotische Bewußtsein, 
der Stolz auf die großen Traditionen unseres Volkes”—by which he means the allegedly 
progressive traditions—“beginnen sich zu entwickeln.”71  This development meant a 
partially more positive yet still strictly limited and discriminating evaluation of Prussia.  
For the most part, Prussia was still associated with the negative line of German history, 
which consisted of militaristic, capitalistic, reactionary and anti-proletarian elements and 
found its modern expression in the FRG, and yet little by little elements of Prussian 
history were integrated into the progressive line that led to the GDR.  While symbols of 
the Prussian past still came under attack, a more nuanced depiction of Prussia was the 
norm by the seventies as reason was found to celebrate certain figures and periods from 
Prussian history. 
 This can be seen in the wide array of historical articles that appeared in Neues 
Deutschland over these decades.  Some condemn Prussia as the cradle of militarism 
almost as harshly as in 1947, as in the 1961 article “Spaltung—Stammpolitik der 
deutschen Militaristen,” which includes a section titled “Preußen contra Deutschland” to 
emphasize the view of Prussia as the enemy of the German nation and people.
72
  The 
article also reiterates the interpretation of the FRG as the continuation of the Prussian 
state; it refers to the “Bonner Staat der klerikal-militaristischen Diktatur” as “ein 
                                                        
71
 Fritz Kopp, “Preußen und die SED,” in Besinnung auf Peußen, eds. Harald von Koenigswald and Hans-
Joachim von Merkatz (Oldenburg, Hamburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1964), 130. 
72
 Werner Müller and Günter Paulus, “Spaltung—Stammpolitik der deutschen Militaristen,” Neues 
Deutschland, August 2, 1961. 
 Munn 24 
barbarisches Überbleibsel der ‘toten Vergangenheit.’”73  Two years earlier, however, in 
1959, Neues Deutschland published an article looking back on Berlin 50, 100, 150, and 
200 years before, which ventured to call the first Stadtverordnetenversammlung of 1809, 
while not entirely democratic, “schon fortschrittlich.”74  The assessment of Frederick II 
remained negative, criticizing the king for his exorbitant military spending on the Seven 
Years’ War (in 1759) while his citizens suffered in hunger and need.  The 1909 struggle 
against the Dreiklassenwahlrecht was praised, however;
75
 a split between reactionary 
ruling class and progressive citizenry was starting to be defined, a distinction which 
would become increasingly emphasized in historical writing over the next couple of 
decades. 
 In 1966 another anniversary was commemorated in the paper: one hundred years 
since the Prussian-Austrian War.  What could have been a damning assessment of Prussia 
as the aggressor in a bloody if brief war was, however, a relatively restrained criticism 
that targeted Prussia, Saxony, and Hannover equally.
76
  While these states’ actions were 
undoubtedly militaristic and anti-proletarian, the rhetoric used to describe them seems 
almost gentle in comparison to the earlier scathing historical analyses.  There is a telling 
paragraph near the end of the piece: “Es besteht sicher kein Grund, Denkmäler zum 
Ruhme Preußens, Hannovers oder anderer deutscher Fürstentümer besonders zu pflegen. 
Aber wir sollten diese Zeugnisse nutzen, um vor allem der Jugend die Lehre der 
damaligen Ereignisse zu vermitteln.”77  This call to preserve historical monuments as 
witnesses to the past without supporting their original political intent is both a reversal 
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from the attitude that led to the demolition of the Berliner Stadtschloss and a 
foreshadowing of the position of the later GDR, which tended to view Prussian 
monuments as depoliticized pieces of culture.
78
  The mention of Prussia alongside other 
former German principalities also evinces a view that placed Prussia on the same level as 
other pre-unification states: reactionary and yet unexceptional, and certainly not the sole 
bearer of fault for the rise of Fascism. 
 Nevertheless criticisms focused on Prussia alone were not uncommon, especially 
due to the attention Marx and Engels understandably paid to their state of origin.  A 1968 
article titled “Karl Marx zu Verfassungsfragen: Die ‘mäßige Freiheit’ der preußischen 
Verfassung” espoused Marx’s contempt for the Prussian constitution of 1848/50.79  Marx 
himself had identified two different Prussias, however, similarly to the two-pronged 
theory: “das Preußen der Charte und das Preußen des Hauses Hohenzollern.”80  While the 
Prussian monarchy was continually associated with the negative line of history, a 
potentially progressive political will as expressed in the Charte was also acknowledged 
within the Prussian state.  Neues Deutschland then draws the connection to the present 
day: “In die westdeutsche Gegenwart übertragen heißt das: Es gibt zwei Verfassungen im 
Bonner Staat—die Verfassung der Millionäre und die Notstandsverfassung für die 
Millionen.”81  In the sanctioned view of the GDR, the FRG was apparently not only the 
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inheritor of reactionary Prussianism, but directly mirrored the situation of Prussia a 
century earlier. 
 At the same time, certain Prussian names were starting to appear commonly as 
heroes of the German people along with a positive evaluation of the “bürgerliche 
Revolution” following the Befreiungskriege.  The introduction of progressive ideals in 
Prussia was commonly attributed to Napoleon,
82
 but the German nation could not 
authentically express itself under foreign rule; it needed native progressive heroes, and 
according to the socialist Geschichtsbild it found them: “Aus den Trümmern der alten 
Monarchie erstanden in Stein, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Fichte und Wilhelm von 
Humboldt lebenskräftige Gestalten, welche die bürgerliche Revolution in Preußen 
eröffneten und die nationale Unabhängigkeit Deutschlands vorantrieben.”83  In 1968 an 
extensive article on the progressive achievements of the statesman Karl Freiherr vom und 
zum Stein appeared in Neues Deutschland.  He is portrayed as an opponent of the 
wasteful monarchy and a progressive thinker; Stein’s Nassauer Denkschrift, states the 
paper, has gone down in history as the basis for the Prussian reforms.  Though Stein’s 
policy was admittedly focused on strengthening the political position of the bourgeoisie, 
he is characterized as a revolutionary for his efforts to include the entire population in the 
fight for independence; “Reformen sollen die Revolution auf friedlichem Wege 
vollziehen, die Volksmassen sollen so für den nationalen Unabhängigkeitskampf 
gewonnen werden,”84 explains Neues Deutschland. 
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 The depiction of Stein as a progressive Prussian statesman contradicts the 
previously common characterization of all aspects of the Prussian government as 
reactionary and completely obedient to the monarchy.  It also refutes the idea of “Preußen 
contra Deutschland”—certain elements of Prussia, at least, actually acted in the interests 
of the German people and a feeling of national unity. 
The equation between Prussianism and Nazism was also disintegrating.  Though 
the Prussian elite was not entirely exempt from blame for Hitler’s takeover,85 a different 
view was reserved for the Prussian state itself.  A 1968 article on the Communist Party in 
the Weimar Republic acknowledged the Prussian government as the “Hauptposition der 
Sozialdemokratie”:86 not exactly the form of progressivism touted by Communism, but 
far from fascist.  The article even implies that an alliance between the social-democratic 
Prussian government and communist leaders was the best hope for preventing the Nazis 
from assuming complete power; the interests of Prussia, an SPD stronghold, and the 
rising Nazi Party were diametrically opposed, and the Preußenschlag of 1932, 
orchestrated by the Nazi puppet Franz von Papen, was a serious blow to the anti-fascist 
cause.  Nevertheless, blame is placed on the Prussian officials for failing to act swiftly 
and decisively enough, and the SPD alone is blamed for not cooperating more closely 
with the KPD (rather than the other way around). 
 In 1970 Günter Vogler and Klaus Vetter published their joint effort Preußen. Von 
den Anfängen bis zur Reichsgründung, an early comer in the wave of historical works on 
Prussia that picked up steam at the end of the decade.  The book was reviewed favorably 
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by Neues Deutschland, which considered it a continuation of the “bedeutende Tradition 
progressiver Geschichtswissenschaft.”87  More clearly than ever, this work, and the Neues 
Deutschland review, acknowledged a constantly growing progressive line within Prussian 
history.  The book review, titled “Der Preußen-Legende ins Herz,” refers to the struggle 
between the two main lines of Prussian history, as presented in Vogler and Vetter’s book.  
One was, of course, the ever-reactionary ruling class of Junkers that led the way to 
capitalism in Germany.  Under the other line, the “progressive Gegenkräfte,” are listed 
“Bauern, die sich immer wieder in Aktionen gegen ihre feudalen Ausbeuter zur Wehr 
setzten, die Aufklärer und bürgerlich Demokraten und schließlich die junge 
Arbeiterbewegung.”88  The distinction between the reactionary and progressive lines is 
drawn with nuance: “Es wird unterschieden zwischen dem reaktionären Preußentum als 
einer politisch-sozialen Grundhaltung, dem preußischen Staat, der weitgehend, aber nicht 
ausschließlich vom reaktionären Preußentum geprägt war, und den Klassen, die im 
preußischen Staat lebten.”89  The period of reforms, the “Befreiungskampf” against 
Napoleon, and the resulting “bürgerliche Revolution,” though “freilich eine Revolution 
von oben,” are listed as examples of progress,90 which by this point had become the 
common view.  Additionally, the era of Frederick II and the “Kampf um die 
Nationalstaatbildung 1862-1871” are acknowledged alongside the Befreiungskriege and 
the 1848/49 Revolution as “Wendepunkten” in German history brought about through 
Prussian influence; even this neutral recognition of what were usually considered eras 
marked by reactionary and militaristic policy is a new development.  Neues Deutschland 
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does not completely forego the warning against reactionary Prussianism, however; the 
article ends with the statement that this brand of Prussianism has found “100 Jahre nach 
der Reichsgründung in der BRD besondere Verbreitung.”91 
 In 1973 a Neues Deutschland article entitled “Das große Erbe der 
Barrikadenkämpfer” appeared, pointing to what was to become an increasingly important 
theme in GDR historiography: heritage.  In this instance, the heritage of 1848 was being 
celebrated; the revolutionary spirit of the time was carried on and elevated, according to 
Neues Deutschland, by the worker’s movement.92  Though the article is critical of the 
reactionary bourgeoisie and the Prussian soldiers who put down the uprising, it highlights 
the growing emphasis on the GDR as the bearer of progressive German traditions and 
heritage, thus fulfilling the need for a patriotic view of German history that would give 
the citizenry a strong sense of national identity and purpose: “Die Revolution von 
1848/49 war, ist und bleibt ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der revolutionären Tradition, in 
der unser sozialistischer Staat verwurzelt ist.”93 
 By the early 1970s, the Geschichtsbild of the fifties had been altered drastically, 
especially in regards to Prussia.  In a 1959 article criticizing a renewed interest in and 
approval of Prussian virtues in the FRG, a writer for Neues Deutschland expressed deep 
skepticism of a West German historian’s view that “auf sein ‘lebendiges Erbe’ kein 
deutscher Staat verzichten könne und dürfe”;94 yet the truth of these words was becoming 
increasingly clear in the ensuing decades.  By the last decade of the GDR’s existence, 
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tradition and heritage, including that of Prussian origin, had been raised to new heights of 
esteem. 
 
     4.2.2    Public Symbols and Events: The Neue Wache and the demolition of 
Potsdam’s Garnisonkirche 
In 1960, the Neue Wache (New Guardhouse) on Unter den Linden was reopened 
after restorations as a “Memorial to the Victims of Fascism and Militarism.”95  Three 
years later, the statues of the Prussian generals of the Befreiungskriege that had been 
removed in the early fifties were returned to their original locations in front of the Neue 
Wache.
96
  While this seems an ironic choice for a memorial against militarism, it must be 
remembered that these Prussian generals had by this point been rid of their militaristic 
associations and canonized in the Geschichtsbild as heroes of the German people.  As 
Fred Oelßner stated in 1952, when the rehabilitation of these generals was beginning, 
“Nicht alles, was Militär ist, nicht jede bewaffnete Macht hat mit Militarismus zu tun.”97 
Nevertheless, the demolition of historically and artistically significant buildings 
continued across formerly Prussian territories, even until the last years of the GDR.  
Other symbols of the Prussian past were not so easily divorced of unsavory associations.  
The program of erasure in the name of socialist development hit one city especially hard: 
Potsdam, which was widely regarded as having served “als Wiege des preußisch-
deutschen Militarismus.”98  The destruction of historical buildings in Potsdam reached its 
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high point in the decade from 1958 to 1968,
99
 with an especially high number of 
demolitions in the last year,
100
 which included the leveling of Potsdam’s famous 
Garnisonkirche. 
 Despite the more measured attitude toward cultural and historical monuments 
emerging at the time,
101
 saving some monuments proved essentially impossible to 
achieve in reality, especially when historical and contemporary political circumstance 
conspired against the buildings’ defenders.  The demolition of the Garnisonkirche, which 
had been built in the 1730s and was considered one of the finest examples of northern 
German Baroque architecture,
102
 saw just such a convergence of factors.  The year 1968 
was marked by the signing of a new, more restrictive constitution for the GDR (the 
“sozialistische” Verfassung), the threat of the Prague Spring in neighboring 
Czechoslovakia, and a number of important anniversaries: Ulbricht’s 75th and Marx’s 
150
th
 birthdays, and the 50
th
 anniversary of the Novemberrevolution and the founding of 
the KPD, among others.
103
  All these were circumstances that might encourage the state 
to reinforce its socialist doctrine with the decisive razing of buildings it considered to be 
on the wrong side of history.  The “starke Konzentration politisch bedingter Abbrüche”104 
that year led historian Hans Berg to characterize 1968 as a “Geschichtshass geprägten 
Jahr.”105 
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 The Garnisonskirche’s unique history also worked against it.  It had been the 
church of worship for the Prussian court and garrison in Potsdam,
106
 but it was not until 
after the end of the monarchy in 1918 that the most infamous event in the church’s long 
life occurred: the “Day of Potsdam” in 1933, when the Reichstag was opened under the 
leadership of newly appointed Chancellor Adolf Hitler at a ceremony in the 
Garnisonkirche.
107
  The impact on the church’s reputation is implicated in a 1970 Neues 
Deutschland article (on the subject of Prussian Crown Prince Wilhelm’s palace 
Cecilienhof, also located in Potsdam): “Am 21. März 1933, dem schwarzen “Tag von 
Potsdam” saß Kronprinz Wilhelm neben Hindenburg in der Garnisonkirche.”108  This 
event was the manifestation of the “Komplott des schwarzweißen mit dem braunen 
Geschmeiß”:109 the symbolic handing over of power from the old Prussian elites to the 
Nazi Party in a ceremony meant to highlight the continuity between the past monarchical 
state and the new National Socialist government.  In his speech to the gathered 
representatives, Hitler spoke of an “unverbrüchlichen Bündnis” between the Nazi 
movement and the historical Prussia.
110
  Afterwards, in the religiose fashion characteristic 
of so many National Socialist ceremonies, Hitler entered the royal crypt alone and laid a 
garland on the coffin of Frederick the Great.
111
 
 Perhaps, given the church’s particularly odious associations from that day, 
demolition was inevitable.  The Garnisonkirche was heavily damaged by Allied bombs 
and stood as a ruin until 1968; nevertheless, rubble was cleared away and a new chapel 
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installed and used until 1966,
112
 when the ruins were made off-limits by building 
authorities, ostensibly on grounds of safety.
113
  Proposals were put forward to secure the 
ruins and return them to their former use, or even to turn them into a memorial against 
war and militarism.
114
  The Politburo was resolved on demolition, however, and the final 
sentence on the fate of the Garnisonkirche was handed down that same year.
115
  As in the 
case of the Berliner Stadtschloss, there were protests from citizens and art historians in 
both the East and the West, but also as in the case of the palace, to no avail.  The church 
was an unwelcome reminder of the “Geist von Potsdam,” which the SED considered 
“immer für das Entstehen der Hitlerdiktatur in hohem Grade mitverantwortlich.”116  In 
light of its perceived political meaning, the architectural value of the building was swept 
aside, as Ulbricht had indicated ten years earlier when he stated: “Wir müssen… 
klarmachen, dass wir ein sozialistisches Potsdam bauen und nicht eine Barockstadt.”117  
Thus the artistic achievements of the historical Prussia were destroyed in the name of 
“sozialistischen Entwicklung.”118 
The Garnisonkirche was demolished between May and June of 1968, unremarked 
upon by the press save for a brief announcement in the “Brandenburgische Neueste 
Nachrichten” on the 25th of June, two days after the conclusion of the demolition work.119  
Thus the SED’s tacit policy of silent erasure of the Prussian past continued; it would take 
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nearly two more decades for the treatment of cultural artifacts to more closely match the 
changed rhetoric surrounding Prussian history. 
 
     4.2.3    Film: Die gestohlene Schlacht 
 The film Die gestohlene Schlacht, released in 1972, was a joint East German-
Czechoslovakian production about the Prussian siege of Prague during the Seven Years’ 
War.  Its depiction of the Prussian forces and their leader, Frederick II, is in keeping with 
the historiographical take on Prussia at the time, with the prevailing militaristic 
associations and especially the negative evaluation of the Hohenzollern kings, yet the 
film is also indicative of changes to come.  The Prussians are still characterized by 
rigidity and complete obedience to the king, and yet the tone is vastly different from the 
earlier Die blauen Schwerter.  This can largely be explained by the fact that the film is a 
comedy; yet such a comedy could not have been made two decades earlier.  The Prussian 
king and his officers, rather than being intimidating figures of authority, are laughable.  
The main character, a master thief named Käsebier, constantly outwits officers and king 
alike through practical pranks and disguises, thus undermining the order and discipline 
supposedly characteristic of the Prussian army. 
 The film opens with a sequence of shots showing both the baby Käsebier and the 
baby Frederick.  Of course, as newborns, they look exactly alike; only their surroundings, 
a plain cottage on the one hand and a luxurious palace on the other, differ.  This 
immediately underpins the socialist tenet of equality and the superficiality of class 
differences.  Indeed, in wry form, the narrator tells the audience, over a shot of the 
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screaming baby Käsebier, to note the newborn’s “Protest gegen dem preußischen 
Absolutismus.” 
 When we first meet the adult King Frederick, he is with his generals in the camp 
before Prague, frustrated with their inability to take the city.  As throughout the film, he 
is obsessed by military matters and conquest.  He is depicted as a misanthropic, wizened 
commander  who yells in his officers’ faces in fits of temper: again, the violent Prussian 
military man.  This is done to the point of caricature, however, so we cannot take the 
threat of this authoritarian king seriously.  His fondness for the flute furthers the figure’s 
absurdity; when Frederick picks up the instrument, one of his generals flips the battle 
plans over to reveal sheet music on the reverse side.  With the music the king changes 
from vicious to weepy, embracing the same general in an apparent moment of emotional 
weakness.  Though the king is a terror to his underlings, his gruff exterior hides a 
maudlin—but not soft—interior, which contradicts the idea of the self-controlled, austere 
Prussian character. 
 Frederick sends for Käsebier, who has a reputation as a clever criminal but has 
recently been sentenced to life in prison.  The king wants the thief to help him infiltrate 
the city in return for his freedom.  Glassenapp, the captain sent to retrieve Käsebier from 
jail, is an officious fool, and the soldiers he commands take their lead from him, as they 
are slow and lacking initiative themselves.  Like the Prussian officer in Die blauen 
Schwerter, the captain and soldiers carry out their orders unquestioningly, but gone is the 
iron rigidity of character.  Rather than being a tool of intimidation, Glassenapp’s anger is 
a punch line every time Käsebier outsmarts him.  He becomes more ridiculous with every 
indignant blow-up, because ultimately his own stupidity is to blame for letting the thief 
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slip through his fingers yet again.  The soldiers under his command are equally clueless, 
but lack the captain’s self-importance. 
Having escaped his captors, Käsebier makes it to the Prussian encampment and 
surprises the king in a disguise; Frederick, rather than being angry or offended, is instead 
delighted with the thief’s cleverness—he probably has some idea of his underlings’ 
incompetence as well.  This has the effect of putting Frederick on a similar level to our 
hero and making the king more relatable to the audience through the act of sharing a 
laugh at the expense of the officers.  He is no longer the cold, distant figure of 
untouchable royalty that his grandfather Frederick I is in Die blauen Schwerter. 
 As in Die blauen Schwerter, another state provides a foil to Prussia: in this case it 
is Austria.  The Austrians are stationed in Prague to stave off the Prussian offensive; just 
because they are fighting the Prussians, however, does not mean that they receive a 
favorable depiction.  The Austrians are perhaps even more ridiculous than the Prussians.  
The soldiers are just as incompetent, if not more so, and the upper class, like the Saxons 
in the earlier film, are obsessed with luxury.  The Austrian commander, Karl von 
Lothringen, complains of having to eat horse flesh—“ohne Salz!”—and is hyper-
feminized (he dances ballet in the besieged city to pass the time).  When Käsebier meets 
with Lothringen as part of the plan devised with Frederick, he taunts the Austrian: “Es 
wird Ihre Schuld vor der Geschichte sein, wenn Kultur und Geschmack von preußischen 
Säbel erstochen werden.”  This criticism of Prussia cannot be taken entirely seriously, 
however, as “Kultur und Geschmack” are being skewered by the film itself; in any case, 
at this moment we are not supposed to believe Käsebier’s words completely, as he is 
engaged in an act of deception and manipulation. 
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 Frederick II is also deceptive and manipulative, however.  Käsebier soon 
discovers that the king has no intention of following through on his word to pardon him; 
rather, he plans to have him executed once he has fulfilled his purpose.  The monarch, 
though less threatening than his predecessor in the Die blauen Schwerter, still has no real 
concern for his subjects.  As he says in voice over as the camera surveys the troops 
aligned for battle, “Tausende von ihnen werden heute Abend fehlen.  Doch wer ließe sich 
nicht gern für Majestät dezimieren?”  This reflects the self-centered, careless throwing 
away of lower-class lives that was still the primary association with the Prussian 
monarchy at the time. 
 Though Frederick II retains these anti-proletarian qualities, his human fallibility, 
which provides quite a bit of comedy, also humanizes him to an extent.  Such a depiction 
of a monarch, especially one as associated with military conquest as Frederick II, would 
not have been possible in the post-war period, when the explicit link between Prussia and 
fascism was so clearly drawn.  Though laughter is far from praise, the comedic approach 
evinces an easing of the gravely serious view of Prussia as the root of all German evil, 
and furthermore hints at a plasticity in the portrayal of the great king that would be taken 
advantage of to a greater extent in the last stage of the GDR’s existence. 
 It is also worth noting that Frederick’s highest ranking officers, those whom he 
gathers for meetings in his tent and to whom he is inclined to give his brief shows of 
emotion, are not made villains in the film.  They are, like their king, caricatures: in this 
case, of blindly loyal servants.  They seem to believe in and depend on Frederick on a 
deep, emotional level, yet the potential insidious connection to the Führer cult that could 
be drawn here is never made explicit.  The generals are never shown in violence, unlike 
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Glassenapp, who has to deal with Käsebier face to face.  They are only laughable in their 
stoicism; one states on the eve of battle, in a moment of melodramatic chivalry, “Der 
Soldat fragt nicht; der Soldat handelt!”  The generals could have very easily been made 
detestable figures of Prussian oppression, yet they remain harmless in their absurdity. 
 Another officer close to Frederick, his adjutant Krusemark, even evokes our 
sympathy; he is clearly terrified of his commander, overworked and underappreciated.  
When Käsebier gets him drunk and offers to copy out the orders the adjutant was given in 
order to falsify them, Krusemark welcomes the reprieve and thanks his new “friend” 
heartily.  The next day, when the king discovers the changed orders, one cannot help but 
feel for the hapless adjutant, who promptly faints upon realizing his mistake.  Ultimately, 
only Glassenapp can be said to be truly dislikable; he lacks even Frederick’s modest 
redeeming qualities. 
 Most telling of the film’s more nuanced take on Prussia, however, is a scene 
where Käsebier tries to convince a Czech girl, Katka, with whom he has fallen in love, to 
return to Prussia with him.  He tells her, “Ich weiß, in Preußen ist der Himmel niedrig, 
und die Sonne klein,” but claims that with her it would all be different—the sky bluer, the 
grass greener, and the birds would stay.  He explains that the birds leave in autumn and 
then come back, “aber dann kommt der Sommer mit seinem Kanonendonner, Luft ist 
dunkel von Pulverdampf und dann fliegen sie wieder fort.”  Yet the birds always return, 
because “es ist ihre Heimat, weißt du, aber dann kommt der Sommer und es marschiert 
wieder und so geht’s die Armee auch.”  Just then the trumpet sounds to gather the troops, 
and Katka says gravely, “Hörst du?  Der Sommer.” 
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 The connection being drawn is between Käsebier and the birds: both are caught 
up in the cycles of the seasons, and both will always return to Prussia, because it is their 
home.  The metaphor could be extended, though, to the relationship between Prussia and 
the GDR itself, and indeed this relationship is implied as Käsebier is the stand-in for the 
East German audience.  Prussia is Käsebier’s home, whether he likes it or not; he did not 
choose it, but it has an irresistible claim on him nonetheless.  He cannot escape his past 
and the fact that he was born in Prussia; it is a part of who he is.  So too for the GDR.  No 
matter the ideological differences, it could not sever itself completely from its Prussian 
past.  The heart of the GDR consisted of land that was once the heart of Prussia.  The 
home of East Germans was once the home of Prussians, and dissolutions and demolitions 
could never fully erase that.  The past has a claim on the present, and East Germans were 
starting to realize that they had to come to terms with this history rather than continually 
trying to refute its claim. 
 
4.3    1973-1989: The Rediscovery of Prussia 
     4.3.1    Historiography and Publications 
The seventies and eighties saw a broadening of public interest in Prussia
120
 as 
well as increased leeway for historians of Prussian history.
121
  One area that relates both 
to the academic and public views of Prussia is that of historical books: not those written 
by historians for historians, but those written by historians for the public.  Examples of 
such publications on Prussia with a wide appeal include Karl-Heinz Börner’s 1976 study 
Krise der preußischen Monarchie 1858 bis 1862 and the even more popular biography of 
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the “Soldatenkönig” by Heinz Kathe.122  After these came Ingrid Mittenzwei’s Preußen 




 Most notable, however, was Mittenzwei’s biography of Frederick II, which 
appeared in 1979.
124
  With this biography, according to Bärbel Holtz, neither the 
Hohenzollern king nor Prussia remained excluded from the Geschichtsbild of the 
GDR.
125
  Mittenzwei emphasized the progressive aspects of Frederick’s reign126 and 
highlighted the modernity of enlightened absolutism.
127
  The biography was well received 
in both East and West Germany.
128
  The recognition from the West was a sign that the 
goal of GDR historiography was becoming less “außerwissenschaftlich”; yet this does 
not rule out the possibility that even a balanced, more positive view of Prussia could have 
a political function in serving the legitimacy of the socialist system.  Fritz Kopp wrote of 
the bibliography: “Ihre [Mittenzweis] Einstellung zu Preußen lockert und bereichert nur 
verfahrensmäßig, nicht aber grundsätzlich ihre leninistische Geschichtsdoktrin.”129  This 
shows that a more generous view of elements of Prussian history previously associated 
with reactionism and conservatism (such as the Hohenzollern monarchs) did not 
necessarily contradict a socialist Geschichtsbild, as long as it held true to the proper 
Marxist-Leninist worldview.  In fact, in the East Mittenzwei’s biography received praise 
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from politicians in the highest positions; Hans Bentzien, the GDR’s Minister of Culture 
from 1961 to 1965, judged the work in a 1991 interview as “eine alles in allem 
differenzierte Sicht auf den König und seinen Platz in der Geschichte.”130  Erich 
Honecker himself read the book and named it, in an interview with the English publisher 
Rober Maxwell, “eine Arbeit, dich ich übrigens sehr schätze,” although he would not 
“auf jeden Satz festnageln […] lassen.”  He did not, however, see the biography as a 
breakthrough in the GDR’s attitude towards Prussia; rather, he judged it to be “das 
Resultat unserer Haltung zum Erbe.  Dazu gehört auch die Geschichte Preußens”131—not 
only the limited, progressive part of Prussia, but all of Prussian history.  Concerning the 
attitude towards Erbe in the GDR, Honecker said: 
Wir pflegen nicht allein revolutionäre, sozialistische Traditionen. Natürlich sind 
uns [...] das Erbe eines Thomas Müntzer und der revolutionären Kämpfe der 
Bauern des 16. Jahrhunderts, das Erbe der 1848er Revolution in Deutschland 
besonders kostbar. Vor allem gilt das für das Erbe der Klassiker unserer 
Weltanschauung, Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, und die reichen Traditionen 
der deutschen und der internationalen revolutionären Arbeiterbewegung. 
 
Wenn wir die geschichtliche Leistung von Martin Luther und Carl von Clausewitz 
würdigen, so stehen wir ganz in den Traditionen von Marx, Engels und Lenin, der 
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung und unserer Geschichte seit 1945. Keineswegs 
ignorieren wir dabei die Grenzen dieser und anderer Persönlichkeiten der 
deutschen Geschichte, ihre negativen Züge, ihr widerspruchsvolles Verhalten [...]. 
Es entspricht unserem Weltbild, die Geschichte in ihrem objektiven, tatsächlichen 




Thus an “objective” and nuanced view of German and Prussian history was, according to 
Honecker, an essential part of the Marxist view of history.  All historical personalities 
and events must be taken into account, whether they had a positive, negative, or 
ambiguous effect on the course of history in relation to socialist goals.  Only then, claims 
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Honecker, could the classic thinkers of Communism and their relationship with history be 
understood and the dialectical progress of history become clear.  This understanding was 
meant to positively influence the actions of the citizenry in ways conducive to the aims of 
socialism by offering behavioral examples.  Honecker saw the biography of Frederick II 
as a part of this objective evaluation of national history, and therefore as nothing 
astounding or new; nevertheless, his implicit claim that this attitude towards Erbe was 
and always had been self-evident in the GDR must be considered with skepticism.  
Others considered Mittenzwei’s work a turning point, or at least an influential event, in 
the development of Prussia’s depiction.133 
 
    4.3.2    Public Symbols and Events: The restoration of the Lindenforum and the 
exhibit at Sans Souci 
 By 1980 the area around the central boulevard of Berlin (the Lindenforum), had 
already undergone major rebuilding efforts.  The crowning moment of this project was 
the return of the equestrian statue of Frederick the Great to its original location on Unter 
den Linden that year.  In 1950 the statue had been removed to a little-visited area of Sans 
Souci Park,
134
 and then in 1961/62 was resituated in Charlottenhof Park.  As the 
catalogue for an exhibit in Sans Souci on the occasion of the 200
th
 anniversary of the 
king’s death explains, “die Erinnerung an die ‘letzten Tage der Reichskanzlei’ mit den 
Halluzinationen vom ‘preußischen Wunder’ des Zerbrechens der Antihitlerkoalition und 
dem Selbstmord vor einem Friedrich-Porträt” made it unimaginable to restore the statue 
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after the damage done to it by the bombs of the Second World War.
135
  In fact, in June of 
1950, before it could be removed, the statue was covered with straw mats on the occasion 
of a parade along Unter den Linden in order to make the shameful monument 
“unsichtbar.”136  Given how scanty the cover provided by the mats was, their use seems 




 Three decades later this was obviously no longer a concern.  Although the 
reinstallation had not yet occurred at the time, in the aforementioned interview Honecker 
referred to the return of the statue as the rounding out of the Lindenforum,
138
 and in the 
same year ordered it to be done.
139
  Speaking about the statue of Frederick and other 
Prussian figures around the center of Berlin, Honecker said: “Das alles sollte niemanden 
überraschen.  In jedem der deutschen Lande gab es in der Vergangenheit Fortschrittliches 
und Reaktionäres, und die Standbilder wurden meist von berühmten Bildhauern 
geschaffen.  Das ist ein Stück Kultur des Volkes.”140 
This attitude towards the monument as a “Stück Kultur” and a historical art object 
is mirrored in the 1986 catalogue “Friedrich II. und die Kunst.”  The catalogue attributes 
the statue’s return merely to the rebuilding of the street itself, without addressing any 
potential political implications.
141
  The purpose of the catalogue was admitted to be 
simply artistic,
142
 and indeed the section on the equestrian statue mostly limits itself to 
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discussing the aesthetic aspects of the piece.
143
  Nevertheless it is noteworthy that nothing 
about contemporary politics and the monument is said, especially because the catalogue 
does remark on the original significance of the location: “Die Idee einer ‘Siegesallee’ 
erschien somit durch den exponierten Standort des Denkmals verwirklicht: Friedrich II. 
ritt auf hohen Roß vom Brandenburger Tor her kommend zum Schloß hin die Reihe der 
Helden-Standbilder ab.”144  The implication of a “Siegesallee” towards the East did not 
escape the critics of Prussia who advocated the destruction of the statue in 1949.
145
  To 
them the statue’s orientation was a metaphor for an anti-East and therefore anti-
communist attitude.  Despite—or perhaps because of—this observation, a political 
interpretation of Frederick’s return to Unter den Linden was lacking.  Hans Bentzien said 
of this silence: 
Es gab in DDR-Zeiten zu solchen durchaus brisanten Angelegenheiten kaum eine 
Diskussion, nie eine wirklich öffentliche Auseinandersetzung, in diesem Falle mit 
preußischer Geschichte. Was hätte man auch sagen sollen? Hätte man zugebe 
sollen, dass kurz nach Gründung der DDR einige ihrer führende Kräfte, quasi in 
Fortführung einer falsch interpretierten antifaschistischen Traditionslinie, für das 




It is significant that the former Minister of Culture only said this after the Reunification 
of Germany.  His statement proves problematic for the socialist Geschichtsbild and 
Honecker’s assertion of continuity in the East German attitude towards Prussian heritage.  
It is clear that Bentzien saw both the reinstallation of the statue and Mittenzwei’s 
biography of Frederick II as a sign of change in the view of Prussia.  This change 
consisted of a silent rejection of the earlier hostile suppression of all things Prussian, even 
in regards to parts of history that had not already been adopted from the negative into the 
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positive line (as for instance, the Prussian generals had been).  One could not, as Bentzien 
explains, contradict the founders of the GDR and their historical interpretation of Prussia.  
The result was that Prussia was severed from its political aspects and accepted wholly as 
a part of East German Erbe, because it had become impossible to fundamentally revise 
the evaluation of Prussia without determining the earlier attitude to be mistaken. 
 Another example of this “depoliticized” Prussia is the aforementioned exhibit in 
Sans Souci in 1986.  Political implications of the art or of the exhibit itself were 
overlooked not only in the discussion of the equestrian statue of Frederick the Great but 
also throughout the entire exhibit.  In the forward to the catalogue the General Director of 
the exhibit, Joachim Mückenberger, gives an altogether neutral portrayal of the monarch, 
neither too enthusiastic nor too critical.  He acknowledges: “Auf die ganze historische 
Person Friedrich II. bezogen, sind wir uns der Einseitigkeit dieses 
Ausstellungsunternehmens bewußt.  Diesen König insgesamt historisch zu werten, wäre 
ein anderes Vorhaben.”147  The far simpler undertaking was to celebrate only culture and 
art.  Although a somewhat critical comment on the character of the king appears here and 
there in the catalogue, the subject of his politics is completely avoided.  Such an exhibit 
would have been unimaginable in the earlier GDR; in that period it was not permitted to 
admire the art of a reactionary regime. 
 
4.3.3 Film: Sachsens Glanz und Preußens Gloria 
Another heavily revised and differentiated depiction of the Hohenzollern king 
appears in the TV film Sachsens Glanz und Preußens Gloria, which appeared in 1985/87 
and enjoyed considerable popularity within the GDR and recognition even beyond the 
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country’s borders.148  The film, which portrays events from 17th and 18th century history, 
is divided into three parts, the last of which is Aus dem Siebenjährigen Krieg.  This 
section focuses on the conflict between Saxony and Prussia in the Seven Years’ War 
through the eyes of both historical and fictional characters. 
The dichotomy between Prussia and Saxony remains much the same as it was in 
Die blauen Schwerter—similar also to the dichotomy between the Prussians and the 
Austrians in Die gestohlene Schlacht.  Saxony is decadent, wasteful, and governed by 
purely aristocratic ideals, while militaristic order reigns in Prussia; a major difference 
from earlier depictions, however, is that this militaristic order is no longer portrayed in a 
necessarily negative light. 
The film establishes the luxurious atmosphere of the Saxon court in Dresden as a 
narrator explains Saxony’s ambitions towards Silesia.  It then cuts to Frederick II on the 
terrace of Sans Souci telling his chamberlain Fredersdorf of his own plans to seize 
Silesia.  He declares, “Die Liebe zum Vaterland und zum Ruhme treibt den Menschen 
zum Heldentat.”  The claim is not absurd, however, as it would have been played in Die 
gestohlene Schlacht.  Rather, Frederick speaks with a self-possessed confidence and 
authority that he maintains throughout the film.  This is reflected in his physicality as 
well; Arno Wyzniewski, the actor who plays Frederick, appears taller and more upright 
than most who have portrayed the king, such as the iconic Frederick look-alike Otto 
Gebühr of Weimar and Third Reich cinema, and Herwart Grosse, who played the king in 
Die gestohlene Schlacht. 
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The film is still implicitly critical of Frederick’s militaristic policy, however.  The 
film cuts from Sans Souci to the battlefield, where we see Prussian soldiers advancing.  
One is shot, and the camera stays on his still body as the others pass him by.  It then cuts 
back to Frederick, uttering a famous quote of his: “Der Soldat muss einen Offizier 
fürchten mehr als den Feind!”  Then, over a montage of superimposed battle sequences, 
the narrator describes Europe’s surprise and disappointment at the war of aggression the 
self-proclaimed philosopher king had waged at the beginning of his reign.  The narrator 
ends, by way of explanation or perhaps excuse, by explaining that Frederick acted 
according to the principles of Staatsräson, and assumed the role of “first servant of the 
State.” 
Early in the film, the main protagonist, the Swiss Max de Simonis, comes to 
Potsdam to offer his services to the king.  The Gräfin von Lamas warns Simonis, who is 
optimistic at the prospect of working for the “Philosoph von Sans Souci,” that this is not 
a decision to be taken lightly; Frederick, she says, considers betrayal or desertion as 
“höchste Verbrechen,” to be “gnadenlos bestraft;” the film immediately cuts to a scene of 
a soldier being disciplined by running the gauntlet. 
Nevertheless, Simonis maintains his positive impression of the king after 
receiving his assignment as a spy in the Dresden court.  As Simonis rides through the city 
of Potsdam, which seems filled with more soldiers marching through the streets than 
civilians, the narrator tells the audience what Max is thinking: “Max de Simonis ist 
beeindruckt von diesem Herrscher, der alles für die Macht seines Staates tut. Die Armee 
ist der Garant seiner Herrschaft.”  But an army needs more than drills, the narrator point 
out—it also needs to be sustained, and so Frederick supports the development of 
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agriculture and business.  The narrator frames the king as practically a progressive, 
remarking on his religious tolerance and the abolition of torture; Frederick welcomes 
farmers and craftsmen who elsewhere are persecuted for their beliefs, and would even 
abolish serfdom, if he were able to bypass his nobles.  To Simonis, serving such a man 
seems “reizvoll und ehrenvoll,” even if his work will depend on deception. 
The film never contradicts this favorable view of the monarch, and it manages to 
do so without blatantly ignoring the harsher, disciplinarian aspects of Frederick’s rule and 
character.  When a Prussian lieutenant disobeys orders and goes to visit his fiancée, the 
Saxon noblewoman Pepita von Nostitz, his transgression is portrayed as the result of a 
lack of judgment and Pepita’s irresponsible seduction.  When the lieutenant is found out, 
Fredersdorf pleads on his behalf for Frederick’s understanding; Frederick, as always, 
demands absolute order in his army.  Letting the lieutenant go would set a dangerous 
example, and so the soldier faces the firing squad. 
When we see Pepita crying over the death of her fiancée, she is surprisingly 
unsympathetic.  Even as she declares her hate for the inhumane king of Prussia, she does 
not appear heartbroken enough for the lieutenant to have been a true love, thereby 
reinforcing the film’s implication that her own carelessness and naïveté are to be blamed 
for her fiancée’s death.  Frederick was simply carrying out the law, which was well 
known to the lieutenant when Pepita convinced him to stay the night with her.  The 
Gräfin von Nostitz, who is Pepita’s aunt and a Prussian sympathizer, tells Pepita as much 
and further justifies the king’s actions.  She says, “Ohne diese strenge Subordination, 
würde Friedrich niemals erreichen, dass seine Ideen verwirklicht werden,” to which the 
Saxon colonel Olaf von Rosen replies that indeed, no army or state can exist without 
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discipline; but that discipline should come not from fear of punishment but rather “aus 
einer inneren Bereitschaft seiner Bürger und Soldaten.”  The Gräfin scoffs however, and 
says that for that Saxony would need “ganz andere Bürger und Soldaten.” 
This scene, perhaps more than any other, speaks directly to the intended audience.  
The “inner readiness” to serve the state that Colonel von Rosen calls for is meant not only 
for the Saxons of his time, but for contemporary East Germans.  The citizens and soldiers 
of the GDR are the “ganz andere Bürger und Soldaten” who possess the qualities that the 
Saxon people of an earlier era lacked, presumably due to the lack of proper leadership.  
This sets up a framework in which Frederick II’s Prussia is further advanced towards the 
modern socialist state than Saxony.  Only a patriotic, socialist upbringing can instill the 
proper form of “inner readiness” in the citizenry; however, the historical moment of the 
socialist state has not yet arisen in the 18
th
 century.  Until it does, Frederick’s goal-
oriented discipline is preferable to the ineffectual leadership of the Saxon regime, which 
does nothing to impart a sense of duty to its citizens and soldiers.  In this respect, 
Frederick was a necessary and, in the GDR’s linear conception of history, progressive 
step towards the ideal German state: a historical figure worthy of an elevated place in the 
Geschichtsbild. 
Prussia’s superior leadership is emphasized through contrast with Saxony’s 
governance at every possible opportunity.  August III of Saxony is a spoiled, whiny man 
of weak character; when forced to remove from Dresden to the fortress of Königstein, all 
he can do is complain that there is “keine Musik, keine Bilder, keine Jagd,” and when he 
hears Frederick has taken Dresden, the first thing he wants to know is what the Prussian 
king thinks of his art collection.  Augustus could not possibly be any more opposite to 
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Frederick in every aspect.  He cares nothing for the actual art of ruling; all political 
decisions are left to the scheming, self-serving First Minister Brühl.  The relationship 
between Augustus and Brühl is also a stark contrast to that between Frederick and 
Fredersdorf.  Brühl is a complete sycophant, obsequiously agreeing with every insipid 
opinion Augustus voices while he runs the kingdom behind the scenes; Fredersdorf often 
provides a voice of opposition to Frederick, but in the end has little effect on actual 
policy because the king always turns out to be right.  The relationship between Frederick 
and Fredersdorf can be seen as a model of the SED’s self image; ostensibly open to 
counsel, but never truly in need of it due to the wise governing hand at the very top. 
Though Frederick’s harshness is never glossed over, the Prussian king ends the 
film on the moral high ground compared to nearly every other character.  Whenever he 
acts with what might be considered ruthlessness, the film presents it as justifiable.  He 
drives his soldiers to exhaustion, but Frederick himself is shown dirty and nearly asleep 
on his horse as he leads his army on; he merely expects the same dedication from his 
subordinates.  Brühl, not Frederick, is blamed for Saxony’s downfall, even by the Saxon 
nobles themselves.  Frederick allows his soldiers to loot and sack the minister’s palace, 
but Brühl’s despicable actions warrant the retribution—the narrator informs the audience 
that this plundering remained a unique occurrence in Frederick’s reign.  In one of the few 
scenes that provide an emotional identification with the cool and distant monarch, 
Frederick unknowingly gives one of his beloved greyhounds poisoned hot chocolate 
meant for him.  The king, who a moment before had been in a rare moment of repose 
reading Plutarch’s Moralia, looks on in concern as his pet whimpers and eventually lies 
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still.  When the servant who attempted the assassination is sentenced to hang, the viewer 
is more sympathetic towards Frederick’s outrage than the doomed man’s fear. 
Even when Frederick imposes a death sentence on Max de Simonis, who has been 
playing both sides in the war, he seems justified.  By the time Simonis is shot trying to 
escape, the viewer has lost much of their empathy for his character.  Against all warning, 
he has succumbed to his own ambition and betrayed the Prussian king.  It is as if 
Simonis’ time in the hedonistic atmosphere of Dresden corrupts him, and he becomes 
more and more selfish as the film goes on.  Frederick is one of the very few characters 
who continue to act on principle to the end; he is consistent with his own rules. 
Thus Prussia receives a rehabilitation through film that Saxony is denied.  Though 
a few Saxon characters retain the audience’s sympathy, it is mostly on a personal level of 
emotion, whereas Frederick earns the audience’s respect.  As Frederick is the 
representative of the Prussian state, that respect is extended to the historical Prussia, but 
not to the historical Saxony.  The choice of title reflects this value judgment; a socialist 
state might admire the “Gloria” of the past, but certainly not the “Glanz” associated with 
the wealthy elite. 
The film ends with the narrator informing us that Saxony will have to start anew.  
The narrator’s last words are: “Aber Sachsens Glanz, und Preußens Gloria”—here the 
film cuts to a low-angle shot (which tends to imbue the subject with power) of Frederick 
against the sky with a golden Prussian eagle perched atop a structure in the background—
“wirken vielfach gespiegelt und gebrochen in die Zukunft.”  This neutral assertion of the 
effects Saxony and Prussia had on the course of history reflects the era’s general 
depoliticized view of heritage.  Screenwriter Albrecht Börner’s assertion that “Allerdings 
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hatten wir überhaupt keine ideologische Absicht, sondern eine künstlerische”149 further 
echoes the separation of art from ideology symptomatic of Prussia’s treatment at this 
time.  Though both the narration and the director avoid explicit political statements, the 
film speaks for itself.  This is not to suggest that Börner was intentionally hiding a secret 
agenda; to the contrary, the fact that he would make and believe such an assertion reveals 
how fundamentally Prussia’s place in the Geschichtsbild of the GDR had changed. 
 
5.  Conclusion: “Ein Volk sich seine Geschichte nicht aussuchen kann”150 
The question remains why the view of Prussia changed so starkly.  Why was 
Prussia integrated, at least superficially, into the Geschichtsbild of the GDR at all?  
Would it have not been far simpler always to suppress Prussia, and hold fast to the 
attitudes of the early GDR?  The problem with this solution, however, would be that the 
traces of Prussia were still so evident.  In the double-pronged theory of German history, 
the progressive tradition alone was not enough to yield a complete Geschichtsbild.  The 
constant rejection of such a large part of the German people’s own history would offer 
little historical legitimacy.  The foreword of the West German publication Besinnung auf 
Preußen, speaking generally of Germany’s relationship with its past, eloquently captures 
the dilemma: 
Flucht vor der Vergangenheit also, aber sie bringt keine Befreiung; sie beschwört 
nur stärker eine größere Bedrohung herauf: Minderung der kulturellen Substanz; 
denn Kultur ist nicht als ein hier und jetzt Lebendiges zu verstehen ohne 
Zusammenhang mit dem Gewordenen aus der Geschichte.  Kultur ist—anders als 
die Technik—auf die Auseinandersetzung mit dem geschichtlich Gewordenen 
angewiesen, denn sie ist nicht eine aus einem einzelnen Impuls entstandene 
Leistung, sondern organisches Werden aus Vergangenem und Gegenwärtigem, 
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“Cultural substance” is necessary for the claim of historical, and thereby political, 
legitimacy; it binds the past to the present and stakes out the communal space of the 
nation through its assertion of continuity.  Culture cannot arise solely out of political 
Tradition, however—it arises “organically” from Erbe.  Thus it is better to lay claim to as 
much history, and therefore culture, as possible; political legitimacy best arises from 
historical precedence. 
Over the course of the GDR’s existence, the depiction of Prussia changed 
drastically from unconditionally negative to selectively positive.  The attempt to claim 
the heritage of Prussian culture for the East German people necessitated the integration of 
significant elements of Prussian history into the Gechichtsbild, which earlier had 
condemned every trace of the Prussian past.  Although the artifacts of Prussian culture 
stemmed from a mostly conservative historical context, they were, as Honecker said, 
simply portrayed as depoliticized pieces of heritage.  That was the only way in which the 
GDR could tie itself more closely to its own past.  Thus the East German citizenry could 
be offered a historically grounded identity without contradicting the socialist founding 
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